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Abstract
We ﬁnd that trade unions have a rational incentive to oppose
the adaption of labour-saving technology when labour demand is
inelastic and unions care much for employment relative to wages.
Trade liberalisation typically increases trade union technology
opposition. These conclusions are reached in a model of interna-
tional duopoly with monopoly wage setting in one of the coun-
tries, and two-way trade. An important stepping stone for the
result is to note that even though trade liberalisation means a
tougher competitive environment for ﬁrms, labour demand tends
to increase. We also ﬁnd that the incentive for technology oppo-
sition is stronger in the more technologically advanced country
and in the country with the larger home market, complementing
earlier explanations for technoogical catch-up and leapfrogging.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F12, F16, O33, J51, L13
Keywords: Trade liberalisation, technology adaption, inter-
national unionised oligopoly.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Is technological progress friend or foe of ordinary workers? If one adopts
a long-term perspective, the answer should be obvious. However, with
a shorter time horizon the question becomes trickier. Better technology
∗Corresponding author. Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Foss-
winckelsgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway. E-mail: kjell-erik.lommerud@econ.uib.no
†Department of Economics, University of Bergen. E-mail:
frode.meland@econ.uib.no
‡Department of Economics, University of Bergen and Institute for Research in
Economics and Business Administration, Bergen. E-mail: odd.straume@econ.uib.no
1could make possible higher wages and better work conditions, but the
labour-saving potential of technological improvement could also spell
job losses and wage cuts. The ﬁnal outcome for workers will depend
crucially on the particularities of the situation. In history, the perhaps
most famous example of technology resistance is the Luddite revolts in
England 1811-1812.1 Framework knitters and weavers broke the new
labour-saving machinery in their industries until harsh use of capital
punishment subdued the riots. Even though the Luddite campaign and
similar incidents during early British industrialisation were largely futile,
the Luddite position appears rational enough. To quote Duvall (1969):
“Most people in 1811 and 1812 found it diﬃcult to appreciate the value
of new machinery economizing labour at a time when goods were a glut
upon the market and when there was, in any case a surplus of labour
available.”
Questions about technology and the labour market are obviously not
only of historical interest. A prominent example of modern Luddism is
the way printers’ unions in many countries managed to postpone the
introduction of new technology for quite a long time. Today many ask if
the IT revolution will threaten the livelihood of blue-collar workers while
highly skilled workers and capital owners proﬁt? Further, should newly
industrialised countries choose technologies that are labour-intensive or
adopt the same technologies as more advanced countries?2 The eco-
nomic literature on these questions is enormous, much recent contribu-
tions centre on the question if the widening wage dispersion especially
in the US and the UK can be traced back to new technology. Acemoglu
(2002) oﬀers an interesting overview. The narrower question about the
relationship between organised labour and technology has also received
much attention, see Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) for a survey
both of theoretical positions and empirical evidence. The theoretical
literature on unions and innovation often focuses on hold-up problems:
the fact that unions are powerful may discourage investments both in
1The movement was named after ‘General’ Ned Ludd, but it is historically unclear
if this was the instigator of the revolt, an alias used by several of the leaders, or simply
an imaginary hero.
2Lansbury, Lee and Woo (2002) couple the bankruptcy of Kia Motors with slow
adaption of new technology, and hint that union resistance might have played a role.
The Korean auto industry was built up using relatively labour-intensive Fordist mass
production in a time when military rule kept wages down. When Kia tried to switch
to Toyota-style lean production, unions had become more powerful, and the attempts
had mixed success. In the economic slump during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997,
Kia went bankrupt and was in the end taken over by Hyundai.
2productive capacity and in technology.3,4
The opposite question, how technological change aﬀects the bargain-
ing position of workers, is analysed less frequently. Dowrick and Spencer
(1994) is the theoretical economics paper that tackle the Luddite ques-
tion most directly: they ask when the introduction of labour-saving tech-
nology hurts unionised workers, so that Luddite technology opposition
would be rational? They study a situation where, at the same time, ﬁrms
have market power in output markets and workers have market power
in the labour market. Rational Luddism occurs in their model when
labour demand is relatively inelastic. Also, the more a union value jobs
rather than wage increases, the more likely becomes rational opposition
to technology changes.5
The Dowrick-Spencer paper is an important building block for the
present analysis. The purpose of our paper is to provide a theoretical
analysis of rational Luddism under globalisation. It is probably no co-
incidence that the original Luddite movement arose when it did. The
years 1811-12 were miserable ones for British industry, one chief rea-
son being that Napoleon blockaded British exports to the continent.6
Blockades of this type are surely less likely now than under Napoleon,
but harsher competition from abroad could perhaps trigger union oppo-
sition to technological change in much the same way? Or would workers
be eager to give their companies a head start in international compe-
tition, so that union resistance to change is weakened? Attempting to
disentangle questions as these, we employ a model very much like the
Dowrick-Spencer model, but where the oligopoly is an international one
3Grout (1983) and Manning (1987) were seminal contributions. Ulph and Ulph
(2001) explicitly introduce innovation in a unionised context, and compare bargaining
structures that to diﬀerent degrees open up for hold-ups by workers after technological
investment is sunk.
4Some authors point out that unions can be beneﬁcial for technology adoption. For
example, Agell and Lommerud (1993) and Moene and Wallerstein (1997) show how
some unions’ taste for wage compression can ‘push’ the economy towards structural
change and modernisation.
5The Dowrick-Spencer model analyses technology and wage and employment
changes within various given structures of labour market institutions. Acemoglu,
Aghion and Violante (2001) develop a model where skill-biased technical change
leads to deunionisation, because the coalition among skilled and unskilled workers is
undermined. Deunionisation removes the wage compresion imposed by unions and
therefore ampliﬁes the direct eﬀect that skill-biased technical change has on wage
inequality.
6As an aside, it is noteworthy that times were harsh not only for workers, but for
many industrialists, too. When Prime Minister Spencer Perceval, who introduced
capital punishment for machine-breaking in the Frame-breaking Act, was shot dead
in the lobby of the House of Commons in 1812, the assassin was not a Luddite rebel,
but a bankrupt businessman.
3— where trade costs of various sorts occur when goods are shipped from
one market to the other. Globalisation is taken to mean that these trade
costs are reduced, so that each national market is more exposed to for-
e i g nc o m p e t i t i o n ,b u ta tt h es a m et i m ei ti se a s i e ra l s of o rd o m e s t i cﬁrms
to sell goods abroad.
Our work is also related to theoretical research on the consequences of
globalisation for unionised oligopolies. Key references are Naylor (1998,
1999).7 Naylor uses a framework that has many similarities to our model,
most importantly the combination of international unionised oligopoly
and monopoly union wage setting. Naylor stresses that globalisation
need not be hurtful for organised labour. Harsher competition can in fact
imply that both employment rises and wages go up. Firms exercise their
market power in output markets by restricting output. More competition
can imply more demand for labour — and a union can take advantage
of such a situation by enjoying both increased employment and higher
wages. True, proﬁts suﬀer, but the situation for workers in a Naylor-type
framework is tied to the elasticity of labour demand rather than to the
proﬁts of ﬁrms, which explains the apparent paradox that workers can
beneﬁt from harsher competition.8
The present model shares many traits with Naylor’s framework, with
the added feature that we study workers’ incentives to sabotage the ap-
plication of new technology. Such incentives are present if the fear of
job losses outweigh the prospect of higher wages. Our main ﬁnding is
that globalisation tends to increase the likelihood that workers oppose
new technology, provided that the industry in question is characterised
by intra-industry trade, and given some fairly mild restrictions on rel-
ative market sizes. Under these circumstances, increased competition
from abroad — due to globalisation — is counteracted by easier access
to foreign markets, causing total labour demand to increase. This con-
tributes to making labour demand more inelastic, which can be shown
to increase the amount of job losses if new labour-saving technology is
introduced. Consequently, the likelihood that a trade union will oppose
the implementation of such technology increases. If technology opposi-
tion hurts the interests of future generations of workers, this problem is
aggravated by globalisation. We also brieﬂys t u d yt h ec a s eo fo n e - w a y
trade, something that occurs for relatively high trade costs. In this case,
7See also, for example, Lommerud, Meland and Sørgard (2003), Meland (2002),
Straume (2003), Neary (2002), Andersen and Sørensen (2003), Piperakis and Wright
(2003) and Munch and Skaksen (2003). Staiger (1988) shares Naylor’s prediction
that the union wage premium may rise with intensiﬁed international competition,
but in a diﬀerent model framwork.
8Naylor assumes products to be homogenous and discusses Cournot competition.
Gürtzgen (2002) obtain similar results for the Bertrand diﬀerentiated products case.
4globalisation tends to reduce technology opposition.
It should be underlined that the results from this kind of unionised
oligopoly model ﬁts rather poorly with historical Luddism. Our model
shares with Naylor the prediction that harsher competition in an in-
ternational oligopoly under fairly mild assumptions will imply increased
labour demand. Globalisation can lead to more technology opposition
precisely because labour demand goes up. As already underlined, the
original Luddite revolts broke out in a period of very low labour demand,
which does not tally well with this aspect of the model. The models of
Dowrick-Spencer and ourselves investigate when a union representing all
workers will oppose technology. A revolt, on the other hand, can be insti-
gated by a subset of workers, for example by the frustrated workers who
have already lost their jobs, so the question of when the introduction of
new technology leads to massive protests from some of the workers, is a
slightly diﬀerent one from the one we attempt to answer here.9
We also ask what market size and relative technological position im-
ply for technology opposition. We ﬁnd that technology opposition is
larger in a country with a large home market and with a technolog-
ical advantage. This points to an explanation why technological lag-
gards sometimes catch-up with more advanced countries or even over-
take them, to complement other explanations that has been oﬀered for
this phenomenon.
2M o d e l
There are two ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerentiated product. Firm 1 is
l o c a t e di nc o u n t r y1 and ﬁrm 2 in country 2. Competition is assumed to
be Cournot, but in the appendix it is shown that the qualitative results
do not change if we instead analysed the case of Bertrand competition.
We adopt the segmented market hypothesis, where ﬁrms maximise prof-
its by choosing sales in each market (country) separately.10 Output
produced in country i (by ﬁrm i) and sold in market j is denoted qij,
so that total sales for ﬁrm i — denoted qi —i sg i v e nb yqi =
P2
j=1 qij.
9Moreover, workers in Britain 200 years ago were living close to subsistence level:
then, in a downswing, workers might give extreme priority not to lose their job. The
present study uses a Stone-Geary union utility function, which is convienient for
tractability reasons and very often used in this type of analysis. However, it is not
fully general, and the possibility that the employment priority in union utility rises
very sharply in a downturn is therfore ruled out by assumption.
10The segmented markets oligopoly model was made popular by Brander and Krug-
man (1983). Neary (2003) presents a general equilibrium picture of international
oligopoly with segmented markets.
5Demand is assumed to be linear11, with the inverse demand functions
for goods 1 and 2 in market j given by
p1j = a −
1
sj
(q1j + bq2j) (1)
and
p2j = a −
1
sj
(q2j + bq1j), (2)
where sj > 0 is a measure of the size of market j,a n db ∈ (0,1) is a
measure of product diﬀerentiation.
Both ﬁrms operate under constant returns to scale with labour as
the only input. Let ni denote the amount of labour employed in the
production of good i. The following technology applies:
qi = φini, (3)
where φi > 0 is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology parameter.
There are two cost components: each unit of labour employed by ﬁrm
i is paid a wage rate wi. In addition, there is a trade cost, t, associated
with shipping one unit of a good between the two countries. In principle,
these trade costs can include both tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ cost components.
We further assume that the labour market in country 1 is unionised,
whereas the ﬁrm located in country 2 can recruit workers from a com-
petitive labour market at a wage rate w2 = w.12,13 For simplicity, we
assume that the outside wage (that can be earned outside the oligopoly
industry) for workers in country 1 also equals w.T os a v en o t a t i o n ,w e
set w1 = w.
We adopt the monopoly union model, where the trade union in coun-
t r y1f r e e l yc h o o s e st h ew a g ea tas t a g ep r i o rt ot h eC o u r n o ts u b g a m e . 14
11This assumption can be considerably loosened while the main results are still
maintained. See footnote 22 for a further discussion.
12Early contributions to unionised oligopoly models include Brander and Spencer
(1988), Dowrick (1989) and De Fraja (1993).
13Lommerud, Meland and Sørgard (2003) and Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard
(2003, 2004) are other examples of international oligopoly models with asymmetric
union power across countries. Naylor (1998, 1999) and Haaland and Wooton (2003)
study situations where unions are equally powerful in all countries.
14The monopoly union can be seen as that special case of the right-to-manage
model where unions have all the bargaining power. We use this model as a simple
representation of a situation where wage bargaining is ineﬃcient because workers have
a larger degree of control over wage setting than over how employment is determined.
When one wants to study unionised wage bargaining and international oligopolistic
rivalry at the same time one is typically forced to use somewhat more simplifying
assumptions than when studying only one of the phenomena, for tractability reasons.
The combination of linear Cournot oligopoly and monopoly unions is commonplace
in this literature.
6Union preferences are characterised by the following Stone-Geary-type
utility function:
U =( w − w)
θ n1, (4)
where θ > 0 represents the relative importance of wages over employment
for the trade union. Note that θ =1corresponds to a rent-maximising
union.
The source of the labour-saving technological change is taken to be
exogenous, and we follow Dowrick and Spencer (1994) by analysing the
eﬀect of a marginal increase in the technology parameter φi.W ec o n s i d e r
the following three-stage game:
• Stage 1: The union determines whether or not it will accept the
implementation of a labour saving innovation.
• Stage 2: The wage rate in country 1 is unilaterally set by the trade
union
• Stage 3: Employment in each ﬁrm is determined by the ﬁrms’
simultaneous and independent choices of optimal output levels for
each market.
S t a g e1i sn o tc h o s e nf o ri t sr e a l i s m . R a t h e r ,w ew a n tt os t u d y
what the union would have decided about technology if it had been
given the chance. The domestic union may well be in a position where
it can sabotage introduction of labour saving innovations. Firms may
anticipate that unions will not necessarily concede to the changes in
manning rules, remuneration systems and the like that new technology
requires. Firms may then in various ways be able to bribe workers to
facilitate the introduction of innovations, but technological change will
nevertheless be more costly and we should expect to see less of it. In
other cases, unions and workers have no inﬂuence over technology choice,
for example when an upstart ﬁrm builds a new plant ahead of hiring
any workers. The present analysis is then not a positive analysis of
technology adoption, but simply asks if workers beneﬁt or not from the
technological changes that do take place, something that in turn could
constitute an important part of a normative analysis of technology policy.
We solve by backwards induction. The next section discusses the
production game at stage 3.
3 Product market equilibrium
For given wages and technologies, each ﬁrm maximises proﬁts by choos-
ing the optimal level of sales for each market. The optimization problem
7facing ﬁrm 1 is thus
max
q11,q12
[π1 =( p11 −
w
φ1




The ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
q11 =












Making similar calculations for ﬁrm 2 and assuming that all quantities
are positive, we get the following equilibrium quantities:
q11 = s1
a(2 − b)+bt + b w
φ2 − 2 w
φ1
4 − b2 (8)
and
q12 = s2
a(2 − b) − 2t + b w
φ2 − 2 w
φ1
4 − b2 . (9)
Obviously, the problem facing ﬁrm 2 is similar, so that the equilibrium
quantities q21 and q22 are of a similar structure as the expressions given
above.
In an international duopoly, three diﬀerent trade regimes are logi-
cally possible: two-way trade, one-way trade or autarky. Two-way trade
means that both duopolists export into the neighbouring market, so this
is intra-industry or cross-hauling trade of the same good. One-way trade
means that one of the duopolists export, but not the other. Arguing
slightly outside the model, if there are several oligopolies in an economy,
we will expect a country to export the goods from some oligopolies, but
import the goods from others, so the result is inter-industry trade.
Our focus here, however, will mainly be two-way (or intra-industry)
trade. Lommerud, Meland and Sørgard (2003) discuss in detail, in a
related set-up, under what trade costs what regime will arise in equilib-
rium.15,16 Two-way trade generally occurs for relatively ‘low’ trade costs.
When we study trade liberalisation with two-way trade, this means that
15Note that even though labour costs will be higher in the unionised country,
there may be one-way trade from the unionised to the non-unionised country if the
technology of the unionised ﬁrm is suﬃciently better than that of the non-unionised
ﬁrm.
16See also Naylor (1999) and Straume (2002) for discussions of trade patterns in
unionised international oligopolies.
8what we have in mind are economies that are rather well integrated to
begin with but where trade costs are lowered even more. There always
exists a range of the model parameters for which the equilibrium entails
intra-industry trade. To see this, note that as the trade costs approach
zero, the ﬁrms either produce for both or none of the markets (the eﬀec-
tive production costs for the two markets are the same). Consequently,
the union will — for such very low trade costs — never want to set a wage so
high that the unionised ﬁrm does not export. Similarly, the foreign ﬁrm
cannot be induced to stop shipping goods into the union home country
either. It could be that the unionised economy had a large technological
lead, but if it is not proﬁtable for the laggard to export at almost zero
trade cost, it is not proﬁt a b l et oo p e r a t ei nt h el a g g a r d ’ sh o m ec o u n t r y
either, so we would not have an operative duopoly. In general, a suﬃ-
ciently low level of trade costs is suﬃcient to induce intra-industry trade
in equilibrium. Even though two-way t r a d ei so u rm a i na s s u m p t i o n ,w e
will discuss the case of one-way trade in Section 6.
Assuming two-way trade in equilibrium, labour demand by ﬁrm 1 is
given by
n1 =
[s1 + s2][a(2 − b)+b w
φ2 − 2 w
φ1] − t(2s2 − s1b)
φ1 (4 − b2)
. (10)
4 Union wage setting
The union’s wage setting is governed by a trade oﬀ between wages and
employment. The ﬁrst-order condition for optimal wage setting, on a
general form, is given by








n1(w;·) is the wage elasticity of labour demand
for the unionised ﬁrm. More inelastic labour demand (lower ε1) increases
the equilibrium wage. Obviously, the wage will be higher the stronger
the union values wages over employment, as represented by θ.U s i n g
(10), the equilibrium wage in the intra-industry trade regime is found to
be
w =
[s1 + s2][φ1θa(2 − b)+w(2 + θb
φ1
φ2)] − φ1θt(2s2 − s1b)
2(1+θ)(s1 + s2)
. (12)
Some comparative statics properties of (12) can be immediately es-
tablished. Less diﬀerentiated products (higher b) will intensify com-
petition and reduce the union wage level. A contraction (expansion)
9of demand from the home (export) market will have the same eﬀect,
provided that there are positive trade costs. Likewise, an increase in
productivity for the foreign ﬁrm will also have a negative impact on the
union wage. This is all quite intuitive. Our main concern, however, is
the eﬀect of a change in the technology parameter of the unionised ﬁrm,
φ1.T h i si se x p l o r e di ng r e a td e t a i lb e l o w .
5 Union opposition to technological change
We consider an incremental labour-saving innovation in the unionised
ﬁrm, i.e., a marginal increase in the technology parameter φ1.L e tu sﬁrst
check the eﬀect on the union wage level. A labour-saving innovation will
cause a wage response from the union insofar as the innovation changes
the own-wage elasticity of labour demand. It is useful to decompose the
total eﬀect into a slope-of-demand eﬀect and a demand-shifting eﬀect: in
general, an increase in φ1 changes both the slope of the labour demand
curve and the demand for labour at the pre-innovation wage. Labour
demand elasticity is aﬀected through both channels. Starting with the












1 (4 − b2)
< 0, (13)
implying that increased labour productivity reduces the wage respon-
siveness of labour demand. This is very intuitive: if workers are highly
productive, an increase in the wage level will have only a moderate im-
pact on the eﬀective wage rate (w/φ1). Ceteris paribus,t h i se ﬀect makes
labour demand less elastic and pulls in the direction of higher wage
claims by the union.
A labour-saving innovation also aﬀects labour demand directly, in
two diﬀerent ways. On the one hand, it reduces the marginal cost of
production, w/φ1, which tends to increase the demand for labour. This
again provides an incentive for the union to increase wage claims. On
the other hand, a labour-saving innovation increases the productivity
of each worker, which has the opposite eﬀect on labour demand, since
the same production quantity can now be produced using fewer workers.
Thus, the overall demand-shifting eﬀect is generally ambiguous. From








1 (4 − b2)
, (14)
implying that increased labour productivity causes a reduction (increase)
in labour demand if the wage elasticity of labour demand — at the pre-
10innovation level — is below (above) unity.17 If labour demand is inelastic,
a small reduction in the marginal cost of production (w/φ1) leads to a less
than proportionate increase in the demand for eﬀective labour (φ1n1).18
Consequently, the ﬁrm does not need the entire existing labour force
— which is now more eﬃcient — to meet the new demand for eﬀective
labour, causing labour demand to fall. Obviously, the opposite result
h o l d st r u ef o re l a s t i cl a b o u rd e m a n d .
Although the slope-of-demand eﬀect and the demand-shifting eﬀect
may work in opposite directions, the net impact on labour demand is
that it becomes less elastic. Consequently, the union will respond to the
implementation of a labour-saving innovation by increasing the wage




[a(2 − b)+b w
φ2][s1 + s2] − t(2s2 − s1b)
2(1+θ)(s1 + s2)
. (15)
A closer inspection of (15) reveals that ∂w/∂φ1 > 0 for all permissible
values of the model parameters.19
If a labour-saving innovation yields higher wages and higher employ-
ment, the trade union would obviously beneﬁt, irrespective of union pref-
erences. If, like in most cases, a labour-saving innovations causes higher
wages and lower employment,20 the eﬀect on union utility depends on
how the union evaluates the trade-oﬀ between wages and employment.
Trading lower employment for higher wages is more likely to increase
union utility if the union is more wage oriented (implying a higher value
of θ). Inserting equilibrium wages and employment into the union utility







[a(2 − b)+b w
φ2][s1 + s2] − t(2s2 − s1b)
. (16)
17See also Dowrick and Spencer (1994).
18Using (3), it is easily shown that the elasticity of labour demand with respect to
the wage level is equal to the elasticity of eﬀective labour demand with respect to













[a(2 − b)+b w




>From (9), it is easily shown that a necessary condition for q12 > 0 is that a(2 − b)+
b w
φ2 − 2t>0.T h u s , ∂w
∂φ1 is positive under intra-industry trade.
20In the present model, it can be shown that a labour-saving innovation yields
lower employment for a substantial subset of the valid parameter values.
11Thus, the trade union will accept the implementation of a labour-
saving innovation only if the union is suﬃciently wage oriented, i.e., if
θ > θ
∗.S i n c e θ
∗ < 1, it follows that a rent-maximising union would
never oppose technological change.
In the remainder of the analysis we will see how changes in the key
parameters of the model aﬀect union attitudes towards technological
change. For the union not to try to sabotage productivity-enhancing
technological change, the union must be suﬃciently wage oriented. In
line with this, we adopt the following interpretation of the model: any
structural change that increases (reduces) the critical value θ
∗ is said
to increase (reduce) the likelihood of union opposition to technological
change. Note that some unions may oppose technological change both
before and after some parameter changes, and some unions may be in
favour before and after. But if we picture the economy as consisting of
many international unionised oligopolies, where the various unions have
diﬀerent preferences over wages and employment, an increase in θ
∗ will
induce more unions to go against labour-saving innovation.
5.1 Globalisation
The main aim of the paper is to analyse how globalisation — interpreted
as a reduction of trade costs between countries — aﬀects union attitude
towards labour-saving technological change in oligopolistic industries.21
The following result is obtained:
Proposition 1 Globalisation increases the probability of union opposi-
tion to technological change if (i) the industry is characterised by intra-
industry trade, and (ii) the domestic market is not too large relative to
the foreign market.





4(2s2 − s1b) w
φ1 (s1 + s2)
{[a(2 − b)+b w






The size-diﬀerence between markets referred to in Proposition 1 de-
pends crucially on how diﬀerentiated the two products are. For very
21In line with our broad interpretation of trade costs, globalisation should be
thought of as any measures taken to reduce the costs of trade, including reduced
tariﬀs, improved quality of infrastructure and reduced bureaucratic barriers to trade.
12c l o s es u b s t i t u t e s ,t h eh o m em a r k e tm u s tb el e s st h a nt w i c et h es i z eo f
the foreign market. However, for unrelated products (b → 0), the above
result essentially applies regardless of market sizes.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 can ultimately be traced to the
eﬀect of trade liberalisation on labour demand, but ﬁr s tw eh a v et o
do a preliminary round of explanation. Trade liberalisation aﬀects the
critical value of θ
∗ insofar as the eﬀect of technological change on the
labour demand elasticity — and thus the union’s optimal trade-oﬀ be-
tween wages and employment — is inﬂuenced by a reduction of trade
costs. Obviously, the trade-oﬀ between wages and employment is only
relevant if a labour-saving innovation reduces the demand for labour,
implying θ
∗ > 0. Consequently, if trade liberalisation causes a larger
reduction in labour demand due to a technological improvement, then
the union must be less concerned about employment in order to gain
from the technology-induced wage increase, i.e., ∂θ∗













implying that a reduction of trade costs ampliﬁes a negative labour de-
mand eﬀect if s1 < 2s2
b .
This result is explained by the relationship between labour demand
elasticity and the labour demand eﬀect of a technological change: the
less elastic labour demand is, the larger the reduction of labour demand
in response to a labour-saving innovation. As we have previously shown
— see (14) — the less elastic labour demand is, the smaller is the increase
in demand for eﬀective labour due to a technological improvement. It
follows that more worker will become redundant when productivity in-




¯ ¯ ¯ if it makes labour de-
mand less elastic. Since t does not aﬀect the slope of the labour demand
curve, trade liberalisation makes labour demand less elastic if it simply












which conﬁrms the intuition. It is important to note that this eﬀect
of trade cost reductions on the elasticity of labour demand applies to a
much larger class of demand systems than the linear one.22
22Writing the labour demand function for the unionised ﬁrm on general form,




n1(w,t) being the corresponding own-wage elastic-
13It is less strenuous to understand why trade liberalisation increases
labour demand. A reduction of trade costs implies that both ﬁrms
improve their competitive positions in their respective export markets.
Thus, total labour demand will increase if the gain of market share in
t h ee x p o r tm a r k e tm o r et h a no u t w e i g h st h el o s so fm a r k e ts h a r ed o m e s -
tically. Since reduced trade costs increase the degree of competition,
and thus total sales, in both markets, total labour demand from the
unionised ﬁrm will increase unless the domestic market is very large rel-
ative to the foreign market. If products are homogeneous, the domestic
market must be more than twice as large as the foreign market in or-
der for the unionised ﬁrm to reduce its labour demand in response to a
reduction of trade costs.23
Perhaps the most interesting implication of this result regards social
welfare. Proposition 1 suggests that the traditional welfare gains of
globalisation — increased competition and lower consumer prices — may
be modiﬁed by increased union opposition to technological change in
oligopolistic industries, which may reduce the rate at which new labour-
saving innovations are implemented.
5.2 Relative market sizes and technological advan-
tage
Maintaining the assumption of intra-industry trade, we will also investi-
gate how union attitude towards labour-saving innovations depends on
the relative size of the domestic market, and the degree of technologi-
cal (dis)advantage. These relations are established by the following two
propositions:
Proposition 2 Union opposition to technological change is more likely
the larger the domestic market is relative to the foreign market.






φ1ts2 (2 + b)
{[a(2 − b)+b w
φ2][s1 + s2] − t(2s2 − s1b)}2 > 0












F o ral i n e a rd e m a n ds y s t e mw eh a v et h a t
∂
2n1(w,t)
∂w∂t =0 , so in this case the inequality
is satisﬁed if
∂n1(w,t)
∂t < 0. Thus, in general, the analysis applies to demand systems
where
∂2n1(w,t)
∂w∂t is negative or not ‘too positive’.
23If products are independent (b =0 ) , there is no deterioration of the ﬁrms’ com-
petitive position in their respective home markets, and consequently — in this case —






4wts1 (2 + b)
{[a(2 − b)+b w
φ2][s1 + s2] − t(2s2 − s1b)}2 < 0.
Proposition 3 Union opposition to technological change is more (less)
likely if the unionised ﬁrm has a technological (dis)advantage.
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φ2][s1 + s2] − t(2s2 − s1b)
> 0
(the denominator in the expression for ∂θ∗









φ1{[a(2 − b)+b w
φ2][s1 + s2] − t(2s2 − s1b)}2 < 0.
Both results are explained by the eﬀect of the relevant parameters
on labour demand elasticity, in line with the intuition given for Propo-
sition 1. If a parametric change makes labour demand less elastic, a
labour-saving technological change is more likely to reduce the demand
for labour (or to make a negative labour demand response larger). This,
in turn, increases the critical value of θ, above which the union will
beneﬁt from such a technological change.
S oh o wd o e sa ni n c r e a s ei nm a r k e ts i z e—w h i c hi se q u i v a l e n tt oa n
increase in the number of consumers residing in the market in question
—a ﬀect labour demand elasticity for the unionised ﬁrm? Once more,
it is useful to decompose the total eﬀect into a slope-of-demand eﬀect
and a demand-shifting eﬀect. It is easily shown that an expansion of
either market makes labour demand more wage responsive. Since sales
increase, a given increase in wages now results in a larger reduction
of labour demand.24 Ceteris paribus, this makes labour demand more
elastic. However, the increase in sales due to a market expansion implies




















1 (4 − b2)
> 0.
15that the demand-shifting eﬀect works in the opposite direction, making
labour demand less elastic. The size of this eﬀect depends on which
market expands. As long as t>0, the increase in sales — and thus
labour demand — is larger if the domestic market expands. It turns out
that the demand-shifting eﬀect dominates the slope-of-demand eﬀect if
the market expansion occurs in the domestic market, making labour
demand less elastic. Consequently, union opposition to technological
change increases. If the foreign market expands, the opposite result
applies. Finally, if t =0the two eﬀects exactly cancel, leaving labour
demand elasticity unchanged.
Consider then an increase in labour productivity for ﬁrm 1 —i n t e r -
preted here as a ‘technological advantage’ for ﬁrm 1.W e k n o w f r o m
the previous discussion that this will make labour demand less elastic,
due to the reduced wage responsiveness of labour demand. Obtaining
a technological advantage will thus increase the likelihood of union op-
position towards the introduction of further labour-saving innovations,
and make it more diﬃcult to increase the technological advantage. The
opposite result applies if the foreign ﬁrm gets a technological advantage.
An increase in labour productivity for this ﬁrm will unambiguously re-
duce labour demand from the unionized ﬁrm, making labour demand
from this ﬁrm more elastic.
The result in Proposition 3 suggests the presence of a ‘catch-up’ eﬀect
in the introduction of new technology. Due to union opposition to tech-
nological change, it may be more diﬃcult to increase, or even sustain, a
technological advantage. Both in industrial organisation (for example,
Fudenberg et al., 1983 and Reinganum, 1983) and in the trade liter-
ature (for example, Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon, 1993 and Desmet,
2002) researchers have studied models of technology leaders that ratio-
nally adopt new technology so late that newcomers overtake them. The
present model, with its focus on harder union resistance to technology
in the technologically leading nation, complements this line of work.
6O n e - w a y t r a d e
In order to check the robustness of our results with respect to diﬀerent
trade patterns, we brieﬂy study the situation where there is one-way
trade into the domestic (unionised) market. In general, this trade regime
would emerge for some intermediate range of t.25 Since, in this model,
the sales in the two markets are independent variables as seen from
the ﬁrms, labour demand by the unionised ﬁrm is in this case given by




φ1 ,w h e r eq11 is given by (8). Thus,
n1 = s1
a(2 − b)+bt + b w
φ2 − 2 w
φ1
φ1 (4 − b2)
. (17)
It is then straightforward to derive the optimal wage:
w =
φ1θ[a(2 − b)+bt]+ w
φ2 (θbφ1 +2 φ2)
2(1+θ)
. (18)
Inserting the equilibrium values of wages and employment into the utility
function, (4), we ﬁnd that the critical level of θ,d e n o t e db yθ
∗∗,b e l o w






a(2 − b)+bt + b w
φ2
. (19)
As can easily be shown, the qualitative eﬀect of a technological
(dis)advantage on union opposition to technological change is not af-
fected by trade patterns, so Proposition 3 still holds. However, the
eﬀe c to fr e l a t i v em a r k e ts i z ei sn o wm o d i ﬁed. Relating to the previous
intuition given for Proposition 2, it can easily be shown that the slope-of-
demand eﬀect and the demand-shifting eﬀect exactly cancel, implying
that the size of the domestic market has no eﬀect on union attitudes
towards labour-saving innovations.
More interesting, though, is the question of whether the main result
of the paper — given in Proposition 1 — is crucially dependent on trade
patterns. Keeping the intuition for Proposition 1 in mind, it is not
surprising that this is indeed the case:
Proposition 4 Trade liberalisation reduces the probability of union op-
position to technological change if the industry is characterised by one-
way trade into the unionised country.






φ1[a(2 − b)+bt + b w
φ2]2 > 0.
>From the previous analysis we know that whether or not trade
liberalisation increases the probability of union hostility towards tech-
nological change ultimately relies on whether or not a reduction of trade
17costs increases demand for labour from the unionised ﬁrm. When the
unionised ﬁrm competes in the domestic market only, a marginal reduc-
tion of trade costs implies that the (domestic) unionised ﬁrm aggravates
its competitive position vis-à-vis the foreign ﬁrm. Consequently, labour
demand from the unionised ﬁrm will be reduced. It follows that the like-
lihood of union opposition to labour-saving innovations is also reduced.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Globalisation can make technology opposition from unions more likely.
Increased international integration is often seen as a force that drive
economies towards eﬃciency and modernisation, but we have here pin-
pointed an eﬀect that works in the opposite direction.
If unions sabotage technology adoption, this should be traceable in
the many empirical studies on unions, R&D, technology adoption, pro-
ductivity, and the like. Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) sum-
marise this body of work as follows: “North American results ﬁnd con-
sistently strong and negative impacts of unions on R&D. By contrast,
European studies (mainly in the UK) generally do not uncover nega-
tive eﬀects of unions on R&D. There is no consensus of the eﬀects of
unions on our other main measures: technological diﬀusion, innovation
or productivity growth even in the North American studies. These cross-
country diﬀerences in the R&D impact of unions could represent either
unsolved econometrics problems or genuine institutional diﬀerences be-
tween nations in union attitudes and ability to bargain. We suspect the
latter is the main reason.”
Unions hurt technology adoption in some circumstances and not in
others. Theoretical studies like this one hopefully can help pinpoint
when what happens, to the aid both of empirical studies and of policy.
One should be careful to draw strong policy conclusions from a model
of any one speciﬁed institutional set-up. This said, the central problem
is — as in many other models of trade unionism — that the union has too
much power over certain decision variables relative to others. Here, this
means too much power over technology and wages relative to employ-
ment decisions. This can in general be solved either by increasing union
power over some variables, or decreasing union power over others. A
nationwide corporativist union might take the long-term consequences
for most of the population into account, so that the outcome resembles
that achieved under eﬃcient bargaining. Taking away a union’s power
to sabotage technology would of course also eliminate the problem that
globalisation fosters technology opposition.
Given the assumed structure — a strong union in an oligopolist ﬁrm
that does not take into account the long-term eﬀect of its own actions
18on the wider economy — it is actually beneﬁcial for technology adoption
that the union is wage-oriented rather than employment-oriented. A
wage-oriented union could be seen as a union where the preferences of
the ‘insiders’ in the union dominate over the ‘outsiders’ with less secure
jobs. Job protection that increases with seniority and other measures
that strengthen insider power will here in fact have the surprising side-
eﬀect of making the union more prone to accept technological change.
Such changes typically increases the wages of insiders — job losses will
have to be carried by the marginal ‘outsiders’, which is of no concern to
an insider dominated union.
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21Appendix
A The Bertrand case
In this supplement, we show that the qualitative results for the Cournot
set-up also applies to the Bertrand case.
A.1 Labour demand
Solving (1) and (2) for quantities, we get (j =1 ,2)
q1j =sj
a(1 − b) − p1j + bp2j
1 − b2 , (A1)
q2j =sj
a(1 − b) − p2j + bp1j
1 − b2 . (A2)







a(1 − b) − p11 + bp21





a(1 − b) − p12 + bp22
1 − b2 ].















The ﬁrst order conditions for the foreign ﬁrm are similar, and solving
for equilibrium prices, we obtain
p21 =
a(2 − b − b2)+2 t + b w
φ1 +2w
φ2
4 − b2 , (A6)
p11 =
a(2 − b − b2)+bt + b w
φ2 +2w
φ1
4 − b2 , (A7)
p22 =
a(2 − b − b2)+bt + b w
φ1 +2w
φ2
4 − b2 , (A8)
p12 =
a(2 − b − b2)+2 t + b w
φ2 +2w
φ1
4 − b2 . (A9)
22This yields production quantities q11 and q12, given by
q11 =s1
a(2 − b − b2)+bt − (2 − b2) w
φ1 + b w
φ2
(4 − b2)(1− b2)
, (A10)
q12 =s2
a(2 − b − b2)+b w
φ2 − (2 − b2)( w
φ1 + t)
(4 − b2)(1− b2)
. (A11)




[a(2 − b − b2) − (2 − b2) w
φ1 + b w
φ2](s1 + s2) − [(2 − b2)s2 − bs1]t
φ1 (4 − b2)(1− b2)
.
(A12)
A.2 Wages and the impact of a change in technol-
ogy
Union wages are again obtained by solving (11) from the main paper:
w =
[θφ1a(2 − b − b2)+w(2 − b2 + θb
φ1
φ2)](s1 + s2) − θφ1[(2 − b2)s2 − bs1]t
(2 − b2)(s1 + s2)(1 + θ)
.
(A13)
The discussion in the beginning of section 5 is valid in the Bertrand case
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. (A15)
Again, the slope-of-demand eﬀect is negative, while the demand-shifting
eﬀect depends on the initial elasticity of labour demand.





[a(2 − b − b2)+b w
φ2](s1 + s2) − t[(2 − b2)s2 − s1b]
(2 − b2)(1+θ)(s1 + s2)
. (A16)
Rewriting , we can again show that ∂w





[a(2 − b − b2)+b w
φ2 + tb]s1 +[ a(2 − b − b2)+b w
φ2 − (2 − b2)t]s2
(2 − b2)(1+θ)(s1 + s2)
.
(A17)




∗ in the Bertrand case, we get
θ
∗ =1−
2(2 − b2) w
φ1(s1 + s2)
[a(2 − b − b2)+b w
φ2](s1 + s2) − t[(2 − b2)s2 − s1b]
. (A18)
A.3 Proofs
It is now easy to show that all the propositions of the main text hold for
the Bertrand case also:
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φ1 (s1 + s2)
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Thus the qualitative result remains, although the exact relative market
sizes that ensures the result, are diﬀerent.¥
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φ1ts1(2 − b)(1 + b)
{[a(2 − b − b2)+b w
φ2](s1 + s2) − t[(2 − b2)s2 − s1b]}2 ≤ 0.
(A22)
¥





2(2 − b2)w(s1 + s2)
φ
2
1{[a(2 − b − b2)+b w
φ2](s1 + s2) − t[(2 − b2)s2 − s1b]}
> 0
(A23)
(the numerator in the expression for ∂θ∗
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a(2 − b − b2)+bt − (2 − b2) w
φ1 + b w
φ2
φ1 (4 − b2)(1− b2)
s1. (A25)
It is straightforward to derive the optimal wage:
w =
φ1θ[a(2 − b − b2)+bt]+ w




∗∗ is in the Bertrand case given by
θ
∗∗ =1−
2(2 − b2) w
φ1
a(2 − b − b2)+bt + b w
φ2
. (A27)





2(2 − b2)b w
φ1
{[a(2 − b − b2)+bt]+b w
φ2}2 > 0. (A28)
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